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Abstract
At arbitrary prices of commodities and assets, x-price equilibria exist under weak
assumptions: endowments need not satisfy an interiority condition, utility functions need
only satisfy are very weak monotonicity requirement, and the asset return matrix allows for
redundant assets. Prices of assets may permit arbitrage. At equilibrium, though restricted
through endogenously determined trading constraints, arbitrage possibilities may persist;
in an example, an individual holds an arbitrage portfolio.
Key words: incomplete asset market, x-price equilibrium, arbitrage.
JEL classication numbers: D45, D52, D60.
1 Introduction
Trading occurs at prices dierent from competitive equilibrium prices; this is the case in ac-
tive, competitive markets, asset markets in particular, where prices adjust while purchases
and sales are carried out.
The study of markets and the allocations that they generate requires a consistent de-
scription of the exchanges that occur at arbitrary prices of commodities and assets. In the
market microstructure literature, market makers absorb discrepancies between supply and
demand. Here, endogenous bounds on purchases or sales yield market clearing.
The problem that arises is to take the consequences of excess supply and excess demand
into account in a way that is consistent both with individual optimization and with the
transparency of markets. The denition of a x-price equilibrium introduced by Benassy
(1975) and Dreze (1975) under certainty extends to economies with uncertainty and an
incomplete asset market.
Equilibria exist under extremely weak assumptions. Any assumption on the interiority
of individual endowments or on positive aggregate endowments is absent. That minimum
wealth is not crucial in models with price rigidities and rationing was observed in Herings
(1996); there endogenously emerging constraints might give rise to minimum wealth points.
Here, the endowments of individuals may lie on the boundaries of their consumption sets,
and the asset market is incomplete on trade; this generality is important in settings with
time and uncertainty.
The payos of assets are not restricted. With the prices of commodities xed, assets may
be nominal, numeraire or real; the payos of assets may be non-linear in commodity prices.
More importantly, the asset return matrix need not have full column rank. Redundant
assets are allowed, which gives rise to diculties in the argument for existence, as it is
now not trivial to compactify budget sets. To restrict attention to a subset of independent
assets is not appropriate: in the presence of trading constraints, an individual may wish
to trade in several collinear assets.
The prices of assets may allow for arbitrage. The logical consequence of arbitrage
opportunities is that all individuals want to exploit them, and therefore all individuals
tend to be on the same side of asset markets that are used to construct an arbitrage
portfolio. An individual performing arbitrage will therefore have diculties in nding
trading partners on the other side of the asset markets. This generates endogenous trading
constraints that limit arbitrage opportunities. An important question is whether indeed
arbitrage possibilities are completely eliminated by the endogenous trading constraints.
Surprisingly, this turns out not to be the case. In an example, an individual holds an
arbitrage portfolio at equilibrium, that is supplied, collectively, by the others.
The existence of competitive equilibria was proved by Arrow and Debreu (1954) and
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McKenzie (1954) in great generality. Crucial to the result, however, was the eective
absence of uncertainty. With uncertainty and an incomplete asset market, the existence of
competitive equilibria poses important problems.
For the simplest case, with nominal assets, denominated in units of account, or nu-
meraire assets, equilibrium existence results are given in Werner (1985) and Geanakop-
los and Polemarchakis (1986). But even in this case, strong convexity and monotonicity
assumptions on preferences are not sucient for the existence of an equilibrium when
individual endowments of some commodities are allowed to be zero in some states. Coun-
terexamples to existence were given in Gottardi and Hens (1996). They also provided
sucient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium in the case of numeraire
assets, which include strict monotonicity and strict quasi-concavity of the utility function
and a strictly positive aggregate endowment as well as a resource relatedness assumption
on individual endowments, which strengthens the assumption in McKenzie (1959, 1961).
In models with time and uncertainty, even such conditions appear strong, as it is quite
likely that in some states of the world certain commodities are not available.
For the case of real assets, a counterexample to existence was given in Hart (1975). A
partial rescue of the model relies on the results of Due and Shafer (1985), who obtained
a generic existence result. However, strong dierentiability and monotonicity assumptions
on utility functions were employed. More importantly, genericity in the payos of assets
is particularly disturbing; also, for assets whose payos are not linear in the prices of
commodities, such as options, though Krasa and Werner (1991) obtained generic existence,
it is also possible to obtain robust counterexamples to existence, as in Polemarchakis and
Ku (1990).
One can argue that, when a competitive equilibrium does not exist, prices of commodi-
ties and assets do emerge against which trade takes place. The determination of such prices
would require the specication of a complicated dynamic process. Here, we consider the
more modest hypothesis that the prices at which trade takes place are given.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, the assumptions,
and the equilibrium concept. The possible redundancy of the asset return matrix calls
for a closer analysis of the set of feasible allocations of assets. In Section 3 the so-called
minimal eective feasible allocations of assets are considered, and they are shown to be
bounded. Section 4 gives a proof of the existence of equilibrium, and Section 5 illustrates
the concepts by analyzing the counterexample to existence of a competitive equilibrium
that is given in Hart (1975). Sections 6 and 7 consider the arbitrage opportunities that
may be present at equilibrium. Section 6 gives some positive results on the impossibility
of performing arbitrage. Section 7 show the limitations of those results, by means of the
example that has been alluded to before.
2
2 The Economy
The economy is the standard two-period general equilibrium model with incomplete asset
markets and numeraire assets. Transactions occur in assets before and in commodities
after the state of nature is known. An economy E = ((X
i
; u
i
; e
i
)
i2I
; R(p; q)) consists of
consumption sets X
i
; utility functions u
i
and endowments e
i
for all individuals i 2 I; and
an asset return matrix R(p; q) that species the payos of assets in units of account at
prices of commodities p and prices of assets q:
States of the world are s 2 S = f1; : : : ; Sg and commodities are l 2 L = f1; : : : ; L+1g:
At state s; commodity (L + 1; s) is assumed to be a numeraire commodity, so its price is
p
L+1;s
= 1: The domain of prices of commodities is P = fp 2 IR
(L+1)S
: p
L+1;s
= 1; s 2 Sg:
Assets are a 2 A = f1; : : : ; A+1g: Asset A+1 is assumed to be a numeraire asset, its price
is q
A+1
= 1: The domain of prices of assets is Q = fq 2 IR
A+1
: q
A+1
= 1g: Commodities
other than the numeraire are

L = f1; : : : ; Lg; and assets other than the numeraire are

A = f1; : : : ; Ag:
The numeraire asset plays the role of the medium of exchange before the state of
nature is known. After the state of nature has been realized, say the state of nature is
s; the numeraire commodity (L + 1; s) performs this role. Following Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1986), it can be shown that a model with rst period consumption is a
special case of our model.
A utility function u
i
is weakly monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in
every state of the world if, for all x
i
2 X
i
; for s 2 S; for k  0; u
i
(x
i
+ k1
(L+1)s
)  u
i
(x
i
);
where 1
k
denotes the k-th unit vector of appropriate dimension. Weak monotonicity in
the numeraire commodity means that an individual that is given more of the numeraire
commodity is not worse o. In particular, it does not exclude noxious non-numeraire
commodities or a numeraire commodity that does not enter in the utility function of the
individual.
The economy satises the following assumptions.
A1. For every individual i; the consumption set is X
i
= IR
(L+1)S
+
:
A2. For every individual i; the utility function is continuous, quasi-concave and weakly
monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in every state of the world.
A3. For every individual i; the endowment is an element of the consumption set, e
i
2 X
i
:
The endowments are an arbitrary element of the consumption set. No strict positivity
assumptions are made. The realistic case that individuals do not possess many commodities
or even that some commodities are totally unavailable in certain states of the world is not
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excluded. This makes it for instance possible to model uncertain outcomes of research and
development.
No restrictions are made on the payos of assets. Assets may be nominal, numeraire
or real. The payos of assets may be non- linear in commodity prices, as is the case
with options. It is possible to incorporate assets that display even stronger forms of non-
linearity, and perhaps even discontinuities. The asset return matrix need not have full
column rank. Redundant assets are allowed for.
Under Assumptions A1-A3, a competitive equilibriummay not exist, as follows from the
counterexamples to existence of Hart (1975), Polemarchakis and Ku (1990), and Gottardi
and Hens (1996). We take the point of view that even when a competitive equilibrium
does not exist, some prices of commodities and assets will emerge against which trade
takes place. The explanation of the prices at which trade will eventually take place would
require the specication of a complicated dynamic process, which is beyond the scope of
the present paper. We start out from the more modest hypothesis that the prices at which
trade will take place are given. The challenge is to take into account in a consistent way
the consequences of excess supply and excess demand.
We analyse the allocation that results given any terms of trade, that is at any given
prices of commodities p 2 P and any given prices of assets q 2 Q: No assumptions are
made on p and q; except that they belong to P and Q: In particular, no non-negativity
assumptions are imposed on prices of commodities. Since no monotonicity requirements
are imposed on non-numeraire commodities, such non- negativity assumptions would not
make sense. In certain cases it might make sense to restrict attention to prices of assets q
that exclude arbitrage opportunities. Since our analysis is valid for all prices in Q; such
an assumption is not made. The asset return matrix at prices (p; q) is R = R(p; q):
At arbitrary terms of trade, a competitive equilibrium is typically ruled out. In general,
excess supply and excess demand occurs. The specication of an allocation that is consis-
tent with the prices (p; q); with optimizing behavior of individuals, and with transparent
markets is non-trivial.
In markets for commodities and assets other than the numeraire, endogenously deter-
mined rationing on net trades serves to attain market clearing. To keep the presentation
as simple as possible, rationing is assumed to be uniform across individuals. In case of ex-
cess supply in a market, all suppliers will therefore have equal, but limited, opportunities
to supply. The limited supply opportunities have spillovers to other markets, which may
introduce rationing constraints in markets that cleared before. Rationing in the supply
(demand) of commodities other than the numeraire is z 2  IR
LS
+
(z 2 IR
LS
+
). Rationing in
the supply (demand) of assets other than the numeraire is y 2  IR
A
+
(y 2 IR
A
+
):
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At rationing scheme (z; z; y; y); the budget set of individual i is

i
(z; z; y; y) =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
(x
i
; y
i
) 2 X
i
 IR
A+1
:
qy
i
 0;
p
s
(x
i
s
  e
i
s
)  R
s
y
i
; s 2 S;
y
a
 y
i
a
 y
a
; a 2

A;
z
l;s
 x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
 z
l;s
; (l; s) 2

L  S
9
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
;
:
The optimization problem of the individual is to choose a utility maximizing consumption
bundle and asset portfolio in his budget set. The set of such consumption bundles and
asset portfolios is 
i
(z; z; y; y):
At a given rationing scheme, an individual is eectively rationed in his supply (demand)
for a commodity or an asset if he could increase his utility when the rationing scheme in
the supply (demand) of that commodity or asset is removed. There is eective supply
(demand) rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset if at least one individual is
eectively rationed in his supply (demand) for this commodity or asset. Prices (p; q) admit
a competitive equilibrium if all markets clear without eective rationing. This makes the
concept of competitive equilibrium a special case of the notion here.
Denition 2.1 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium for the economy E at prices (p; q) is a pair
((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) such that
1. for every individual, (x
i
; y
i
) 2 
i
(z

; z

; y

; y

);
2.
P
I
i=1
x
i
=
P
I
i=1
e
i
and
P
I
i=1
y
i
= 0;
3. for every l 2

L; if for some i
0
x
i
0

l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
= z

l;s
; then for all i 2 I x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
< z

l;s
;
while if for some i
0
x
i
0

l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
= z

l;s
; then for all i 2 I x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
> z

l;s
; and
4. for every a 2

A; if for some i
0
y
i
0

a
= y

a
; then for all i 2 I y
i
a
< y

a
; while if for some
i
0
y
i
0

a
= y

a
; then for all i 2 I y
i
a
> y

a
:
Conditions 1 and 2 are the usual optimization and market clearing conditions. Condi-
tions 3 and 4, together with the convexity of the consumption sets and the quasi-concavity
of the utility functions of individuals, imply that there is no eective rationing, simultane-
ously, on both sides of a market. This expresses that we do not depart from the scenario
of frictionless markets that characterizes competitive equilibria with incomplete markets.
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Markets are transparent in the sense that it is not possible to nd a buyer and a seller
in a single market that could benet from mutual exchange against the numeraire. The
denition of equilibrium is a special case of the denition given in Dreze (1975) to analyze
the consequences of price rigidities on the allocation of resources in a complete markets
setting.
3 Minimal Eective Feasible Allocations of Assets
The standard approach to show the existence of an equilibrium is to compactify consump-
tion sets, show upper hemi-continuity of the demand correspondence 
i
; i 2 I; and apply
Kakutani's xed point theorem to a suitably constructed correspondence. This approach
fails in out set-up as a compactied consumption set does not generate bounds on as-
sets portfolios that individuals may be willing to hold. This is due to the absence of an
assumption that requires that assets are not collinear.
In the standard incomplete markets model, the absence of collinearity poses no prob-
lems. One restricts attention to an independent subset of assets whose span equals the span
of the asset return matrix. Such an approach fails in our set-up because endogenous ra-
tioning constraints are present. Individuals have good reasons to trade in several collinear
assets if this mitigates the restrictions imposed by rationing. There is no way to select an
independent subset of assets a priori, without possibly limiting the trading opportunities
of the individuals.
In this section we show that it is still possible to compactify the set of asset portfolios,
without reducing the trading opportunities of individuals. Our aim is basically to consider
only asset portfolios that are minimally eective, i.e. achieve a certain distribution of
revenues over future states with minimal trade in the asset market. A further complication
is that one should not consider minimal eective portfolios of assets, but minimal eective
feasible allocations of assets. Indeed, if at some given equilibrium ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

))
the asset portfolios y
i
; i 2 I; are replaced by minimal eective asset portfolios, it is not
necessarily the case that the asset markets still clear. Minimal eective feasible allocations
of assets is what is called for.
The eective consumption set of individual i is
X
i
= fx
i
2 X
i
: x
i
l;s

X
i2I
e
i
l;s
; (l; s) 2 L  Sg:
If (x
1
; : : : ; x
I
) is a feasible allocation of commodities, then x
i
2 X
i
for every individual.
Associated with a consumption plan x
i
of individual i; there is a revenue plan w
i
(x
i
) =
(w
i
1
(x
i
1
); : : : ; w
i
S
(x
i
S
))
0
2 IR
S
; where w
i
s
(x
i
s
) = p
s
(x
i
s
  e
i
s
): The set of eective revenue plans
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of individual i is
W
i
= fw
i
2 IR
S
: there is x
i
2 X
i
such that w
i
= w
i
(x
i
)g:
The set of eective portfolios of assets of individual i is
Y
i
= fy
i
2 IR
A+1
: qy
i
= 0; there is w
i
2 W
i
such that w
i
= Ry
i
g:
The sets X
i
and W
i
are obviously compact. This is not necessarily so for the set of
eective portfolios of assets of an individual, since the matrix of payos of assets need not
have full column rank.
The set of eective feasible allocations of assets for the economy is
Y = fy 2
Y
i2I
Y
i
:
X
i2I
y
i
= 0g:
Equivalently, y 2 Y if there is w
i
2 W
i
; i 2 I; such that
My = (w
1
0
; : : : ; w
I
0
; 0; 0)
0
;
where
M =
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
4
R 0 0
0
.
.
.
0
0 0 R
q 0 0
0
.
.
.
0
0 0 q
I
A+1
   I
A+1
3
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
5
;
and I
A+1
denotes the unit matrix of dimension A + 1: The matrix M is of dimension
(IS + I + A+ 1) I(A + 1):
The set of minimal eective feasible allocations of assets is
b
Y = fy 2 Y :6 9y 2 Y with sign(y) = sign(y); jyj < jyjg;
where sign(x) denotes the sign vector and jxj the absolute value vector associated with
the vector x: A component of sign(x) is 1; 0 or  1 if the corresponding component of x is
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> 0; 0 or < 0; respectively. A component of jxj is the absolute value of the corresponding
component of x: The set
b
Y contains the eective feasible allocations of assets that are
minimal. There is no eective feasible allocation of assets such that at least one individual
could attain the same revenue plan with less trade, in absolute value, in at least one of the
assets.
In the analysis of the set of equilibria of an economy, there is no loss of generality to
restrict attention to minimal eective feasible allocations of assets in the following sense.
If ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) is an equilibrium for E at prices (p; q); then there is
b
y 2
b
Y such
that ((x

;
b
y); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) is an equilibrium for E at prices (p; q): Our aim is to show that
b
Y is bounded.
Since M need not have full column rank, the left-inverse of M may not exist. By
the singular value decomposition, there exist orthogonal matrices U; of dimension (I(S +
1) + A + 1)  (I(S + 1) + A + 1); and V; of dimension I(A + 1)  I(A + 1); such that
U
0
MV = diag(
1
; : : : ; 
I(A+1)
); where diag() denotes a diagonal matrix of appropriate
dimension with the components of  on the diagonal. Moreover, there is r such that the rst
r elements of diag(
1
; : : : ; 
I(A+1)
) are positive and the others are zero. The Moore-Penrose
inverse of M is dened by M
+
= V 
+
U
0
; where 
+
= diag(1=
1
; : : : ; 1=
r
; 0; : : : ; 0):
An important property of the Moore-Penrose inverse is the following. Consider some
z 2 IR
I(S+1)+A+1
: If y
R
= M
+
z; then y
R
is an element in the row space of M such that
z = My
R
; and y
R
is the unique element of the row space of M with this property.
Lemma 3.1 The set
b
Y is bounded.
Proof If
b
Y is not bounded, then there exists a sequence (y
n
2
b
Y : n = 1; : : :) such that
ky
n
k
1
 n: We dene w
n
= ((Ry
1
n
)
0
; : : : ; (Ry
I
n
)
0
)
0
: Since W
i
is compact, there is no loss of
generality in assuming that the sequence (w
n
2 IR
IS
: n = 1; : : :) is convergent. Moreover,
without loss of generality, sign(y
n
) is independent of n: For n = 1; : : : ;
y
R;n
=M
+
(w
0
n
; 0; 0)
0
and y
N;n
= y
n
  y
R;n
:
The sequence (y
R;n
: n = 1; : : :) is convergent, and therefore bounded. Since (y
n
2
b
Y :
n = 1; : : :) is unbounded, without loss of generality, the sequence
(
1
ky
N;n
k
1
y
N;n
: n = 1; : : :)
is well-dened and convergent, with limit y
N
: Evidently, My
N
= 0; and there is i
0
such that
y
i
0
N
6= 0:
Moreover, y
i
N;a
6= 0 implies lim
n!1
jy
i
n;a
j = 1; sign(y
i
n;a
) > 0 implies y
i
N;a
 0;
sign(y
i
n;a
) = 0 implies y
i
N;a
= 0; and sign(y
i
n;a
) < 0 implies y
i
N;a
 0:
So, there exists n
0
such that for n  n
0
; sign(y
n
  y
N
) = sign(y
n
):
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Furthermore, for n  n
0
; M(y
n
  y
N
) = My
n
; whereas jy
i
n;a
  y
i
N;a
j  jy
i
n;a
j and there is
a
0
such that jy
i
0
n;a
0
  y
i
0
N;a
0
j < jy
i
0
n;a
0
j:
Hence, for n  n
0
; y
n
=2
b
Y; a contradiction. 2
Even when arbitrage possibilities are present, it is possible to restrict attention to a
bounded set of asset allocations. Since
b
Y is bounded, there exists
b
 > 0 such that kyk
1
<
b

for all y 2
b
Y:
4 The Existence of Equilibria
To show the existence of equilibrium, it is essential that budget constraints hold with
equality. Since the utility functions of individuals are weakly monotonically increasing in
the numeraire commodity, there is no loss of generality in assuming that all second period
budget constraints hold with equality. For the rst period budget constraint, either one
imposes this condition directly on the budget set, or one makes the following assumption.
A4. The numeraire asset satises R
A+1
 0:
Since the utility functions of individuals are weakly monotonically increasing in all
numeraire commodities, R
A+1
 0 implies that the numeraire asset is weakly desirable, so
without loss of generality the budget constraint of the individual in the market for assets
is satised with equality.
It can be veried that if rst period consumption is present, Assumption A4 is au-
tomatically satised if the model with rst period consumption is rewritten into the one
without rst period consumption.
At a rationing scheme (z; z; y; y); the exact budget set
e

i
(z; z; y; y) of individual i is
the set of elements (x
i
; y
i
) 2 
i
(z; z; y; y) that satisfy the budget constraint in every state
with equality: qy
i
= 0 and p
s
(x
i
s
  e
i
s
) = R
s
y
i
: The exact demand set
e

i
(z; z; y; y) of the
individual is the set of utility maximizing elements (x
i
; y
i
) in
e

i
(z; z; y; y):
Non-emptiness of 
i
(z; z; y; y) implies non-emptiness of
e

i
(z; z; y; y); since the utility
function is weakly monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in every state.
Nevertheless,
e

i
(z; z; y; y) can be a proper subset of 
i
(z; z; y; y); since the utility function
is not necessarily strictly monotonically increasing.
Lemma 4.1 If E satises A1-A3, then the correspondence
e

i
is non-empty, compact and
convex valued, and upper hemi-continuous.
Proof For any rationing scheme (z; z; y; y); (e
i
; 0) 2
e

i
(z; z; y; y); so
e

i
(z; z; y; y) is non-
empty.
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It is obvious that
e

i
(z; z; y; y) is closed and convex.
The set of non-numeraire commodities

L  S is partitioned into the subsets of com-
modities with positive prices, K
+
; negative prices, K
 
; and free commodities, K
0
: The set
of non-numeraire assets

A is partitioned into the subsets of assets with positive prices, A
+
;
negative prices, A
 
; and free assets, A
0
: For (x
i
; y
i
) 2
e

i
(z; z; y; y);  y
a
 y
i
a
 y
a
; a 2

A;
and
y
i
A+1
=  
P
a2

A
q
a
y
i
a
  
P
a2A
 
q
a
y
a
 
P
a2A
+
q
a
y
a
;
y
i
A+1
=  
P
a2

A
q
a
y
i
a
  
P
a2A
 
q
a
y
a
 
P
a2A
+
q
a
y
a
;
and, thus, the asset demands are bounded. Moreover,
0  x
i
l;s
 e
i
l;s
+ z
l;s
; (l; s) 2

L  S;
0  x
i
L+1;s
 e
i
L+1;s
 
P
(l;s)2K
 
p
l;s
z
l;s
+
P
(l;s)2K
+
p
l;s
e
i
l;s
+R
s
y
i
; s 2 S;
and it follows, from the boundedness of the feasible asset demands, that the feasible spot
market demands are bounded as well. Therefore,
e

i
(z; z; y; y) is compact. By the continuity
and quasi- concavity of the utility function,
e

i
(z; z; y; y) is compact and convex.
A sequence, ((z
n
; z
n
; y
n
; y
n
) 2  IR
LS
+
 IR
LS
+
  IR
A
+
 IR
A
+
: n = 1; : : :); converges to
(z; z; y; y); then, For any sequence ((x
i
n
; y
i
n
) 2
e

i
(z
n
; z
n
; y
n
; y
n
) : n = 1; : : :);
 y
n;a
 y
i
n;a
 y
n;a
; a 2

A;
 
P
a2A
 
q
a
y
n;a
 
P
a2A
+
q
a
y
n;a
 y
i
n;A+1
  
P
a2A
 
q
a
y
n;a
 
P
a2A
+
q
a
y
n;a
:
Since lim
n!1
(y
n
; y
n
) = (y; y); it follows that the sequence (y
i
n
: n = 1; : : :) is bounded.
Similarly, since
0  x
i
n;l;s
 e
i
l;s
+ z
n;l;s
; (l; s) 2

L  S;
0  x
i
n;L+1;s
 e
i
L+1;s
 
P
(l;s)2K
 
p
l;s
z
n;l;s
+
P
(l;s)2K
+
p
l;s
e
i
l;s
+R
s
y
i
n
; s 2 S;
the sequence ((z
n
; z
n
) : n = 1; : : :) is convergent as is, as a consequence, the sequence
(x
i
n
: n = 1; : : :): It follows that ((x
i
n
; y
i
n
) : n = 1; : : :) has a convergent subsequence, also
denoted ((x
i
n
; y
i
n
) : n = 1; : : :); with limit (
b
x
i
;
b
y
i
) 2
e

i
(z; z; y; y):
If there exists (
e
x
i
;
e
y
i
) 2
e

i
(z; z; y; y); such that u
i
(
e
x
i
) > u
i
(
b
x
i
); then
e
K
 
(
e
K
+
) is the set
of non-numeraire commodities for which
e
x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
is negative (positive), and
e
A
 
(
e
A
+
) is
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the set of non-numeraire assets for which
e
y
i
a
is negative (positive). Moreover, for n = 1; : : : ;

n
=
minf1;
z
n;l;s
ex
i
l;s
 e
i
l;s
; (l; s) 2
e
K
 
;
z
n;l;s
ex
i
l;s
 e
i
l;s
; (l; s) 2
e
K
+
;
y
n;a
ey
i
a
; a 2
e
A
 
;
y
n;a
ey
i
a
; a 2
e
A
+
g;
e
x
i
n
= e
i
+ 
n
(
e
x
i
  e
i
);
e
y
i
n
= 
n
e
y
i
:
Since
q
e
y
i
n
= 
n
q
e
y
i
= 0;
p
s
(
e
x
i
n;s
  e
i
s
) = 
n
p
s
(
e
x
i
s
  e
i
s
) = 
n
R
s
e
y
i
= R
s
e
y
i
n
;
e
x
i
n;l;s
  e
i
l;s
= 
n
(
e
x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
) 
z
n;l;s
ex
i
l;s
 e
i
l;s
(
e
x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
) = z
n;l;s
; (l; s) 2
e
K
 
;
e
x
i
n;l;s
  e
i
l;s
= 
n
(
e
x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
)  0  z
n;l;s
; (l; s) 2 (

L  S) n
e
K
 
;
e
x
i
n;l;s
  e
i
l;s
= 
n
(
e
x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
) 
z
n;l;s
ex
i
l;s
 e
i
l;s
(
e
x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
) = z
n;l;s
; (l; s) 2
e
K
+
;
e
x
i
n;l;s
  e
i
l;s
= 
n
(
e
x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
)  0  z
n;l;s
; (l; s) 2 (

L  S) n
e
K
+
;
y
n;a
=
y
n;a
ey
i
a
e
y
i
a
 
n
e
y
i
a
=
e
y
i
n;a
 0  y
n;a
; a 2
e
A
 
;
y
n;a
 0 
e
y
i
n;a
= 
n
e
y
i
a

y
n;a
ey
i
a
e
y
i
a
= y
n;a
; a 2
e
A
+
;
(
e
x
i
n
;
e
y
i
n
) 2
e

i
(z
n
; z
n
; y
n
; y
n
): Evidently, lim
n!1

n
= 1; and lim
n!1
(
e
x
i
n
;
e
y
i
n
) = (
e
x
i
;
e
y
i
): By
the continuity of the function u
i
; u
i
(
e
x
i
n
) > u
i
(x
i
n
) for n suciently large, which contradicts
(x
i
n
; y
i
n
) 2
e

i
(z
n
; z
n
; y
n
; y
n
): Consequently,
e

i
is upper hemi-continuous. 2
The demand of individuals depends in an upper hemi-continuous way on the constraints
they face in the markets of the non- numeraire assets and commodities. It is not necessary
to compactify consumption sets in order to get this result, even though there are no restric-
tions whatsoever in the markets of the numeraire assets and the numeraire commodities.
It is more surprising, and more important, that neither interiority assumptions nor
a survival assumption are made with respect to initial endowments. Figure 1 illustrates
that even though lower hemi-continuity of the budget correspondence in prices may fail,
lower hemi-continuity in rationing constraints is satised. When going from left to right
11
in Figure 1, rationing constraints do not change, but prices do. Lower hemi-continuity of
the budget set fails. When going from top do bottom in Figure 1, prices do not change,
but rationing constraints do. Now lower hemi- continuity of the budget constraint is not
violated.
The set of equilibria for E is not compact, because allocations of assets are not neces-
sarily bounded, and rationing schemes are not bounded. There is a compact subset of the
set of equilibria that contains all equilibrium allocations.
If ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

); (x

; y

)) is an equilibrium for E at prices (p; q): There is a min-
imal eective feasible allocation of assets
b
y 2
b
Y satisfying
P
i2I
b
y
i
= 0; and, for every
individual, R
b
y
i
= Ry
i
; q
b
y
i
= qy
i
; sign(
b
y
i
) = sign(y
i
); and j
b
y
i
a
j  jy
i
a
j; for all a 2 A:
It is not excluded that
b
y = y

: It follows that (x
i
;
b
y
i
) 2
e

i
(z

; z

; y

; y

); i 2 I; and that
((x

;
b
y); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) is an equilibrium.
In the market for a commodity, (l; s) 2

L  S; if there is an individual i
0
such that
x
i
0

l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
= z

l;s
; then by the denition of an equilibrium, no individual is eectively
rationed in his demand for commodity (l; s); so x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
< z

l;s
; i 2 I: For a xed " > 0;
if z
l;s
= " +
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
; then x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
< z
l;s
; i 2 I: If there is an individual, i
0
; such that
x
i
0

l;s
 e
i
0
l;s
= z

l;s
; then no individual is eectively rationed in his supply for commodity (l; s);
so x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
> z

l;s
; i 2 I: If z
l;s
=  " 
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
; then x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
>  z
l;s
; i 2 I:
In the market for some asset a 2

A; if there is an individual i
0
such that
b
y
i
0
a
= y
a
; then
no individual is eectively rationed in his demand for asset a;
b
y
i
a
< y

a
; i 2 I: Since
b
y
i
a
<
b
;
if y
a
=
b
; then
b
y
i
a
< y
a
; i 2 I: If there is an individual i
0
such that
b
y
i
0
a
= y

a
; then no
individual is eectively rationed in his supply for asset a;
b
y
i
a
> y

a
; i 2 I: Since
b
y
i
a
>  
b
;
if y
a
=  
b
; then
b
y
i
a
> y
a
; i 2 I:
In conclusion, if ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) is an equilibrium, then there is an equilibrium
((x

;
b
y); (z; z; y; y)) with k(z; z)k
1
bounded by
P
i2I
e
i
+ "; k(y; y)k
1
bounded by
b
; kx

k
1
bounded by
P
i2I
e
i
and k
b
yk
1
bounded by
b
:We restrict our attention to rationing schemes
and allocations that satisfy these bounds.
The unit cube of dimension K is C
K
= fr 2 IR
K
: 0  r
k
 1; k = 1; : : : ; Kg The
functions (z; z) : C
LS
!  IR
LS
+
 IR
LS
+
and (y; y) : C
A
!  IR
A
+
 IR
A
+
are dened by
z
l;s
(r) =  minf2r
l;s
(
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
+ ");
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
+ "g; (l; s) 2

L  S;
z
l;s
(r) = minf(2  2r
l;s
)(
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
+ ");
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
+ "g; (l; s) 2

L  S;
y
a
() =  minf2
a
b
;
b
g; a 2

A;
y
a
() = minf(2  2
a
)
b
;
b
g; a 2

A;
for a xed " > 0:
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Figure 1. Continuity properties of the budget correspondence.
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Attention is restricted to rationing schemes in the image of the functions (z; z) and
(y; y): The state of the commodity markets is described by r 2 C
LS
and the state of the
asset markets by  2 C
A
: If 0  r
l;s
 1=2; then there may be supply rationing in the market
of commodity (l; s); while demand rationing is excluded by putting z
l;s
(r) =
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
+ ";
if 1=2  r
l;s
 1; then there may be demand rationing in the market of commodity (l; s);
while supply rationing is excluded by putting z
l;s
(r) =  
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
  ": If 0  
a
 1=2;
then there may be supply rationing in the market of asset a; while demand rationing is
excluded by putting y
a
() =
b
; if 1=2  
a
 1; then there may be demand rationing in
the market of asset a; while supply rationing is excluded by putting y
a
() =  
b
:
The correspondences
b

i
; i 2 I; and
b
; with domain C
LS
 C
A
are dened by
b

i
(r; ) =
e

i
(z(r); z(r); y(); y());
b
(r; ) =
P
i2I
b

i
(r; )  f
P
i2I
e
i
g:
The correspondence
b

i
is a restriction of the correspondence
e

i
; with rationing schemes
being parametrized by the sets C
LS
and C
A
:
Lemma 4.2 If E satises A1-A4, then, if 0 2
b
(r

; 

); there exists (x
i
;
b
y
i
) 2
b

i
(r

; 

);
i 2 I; such that ((x

; y

); (z(r

); z(r

); y(

); y(

))) is an equilibrium for E : If ((x

; y

);
(z

; z

; y

; y

)) is an equilibrium for E ; then there exists (r

; 

) 2 C
LS
 C
A
such that
0 2
b
(r

; 

) and there exists
b
y 2
b
Y such that (x
i
;
b
y
i
) 2
b

i
(r

; 

); i 2 I:
Proof If (r

; 

) 2 C
LS
 C
A
is such that 0 2
b
(r

; 

); then there exists (x
i
; y
i
) 2
e

i
(z(r

); z(r

); y(

); y(

)); i 2 I; such that
P
i2I
x
i
=
P
i2I
e
i
and
P
i2I
y
i
= 0: There
is a minimal eective feasible allocation of assets
b
y 2
b
Y; such that
P
i2I
b
y
i
= 0 and, for
every individual, R
b
y
i
= Ry
i
; q
b
y
i
= qy
i
; sign(
b
y
i
) = sign(y
i
); and j
b
y
i
a
j  jy
i
a
j; a 2 A: This
implies that (x
i
;
b
y
i
) 2
e

i
(z(r

); z(r

); y(

); y(

)) and that (1) and (2) of the denition of
an equilibrium are satised by ((x

;
b
y); (z(r

); z(r

); y(

); y(

))):
If, for (l; s) 2

L  S; x
i
0

l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
= z
l;s
(r

) for some i
0
2 I; then z
l;s
(r

)   e
i
0
l;s
>
 
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
  ": So r

l;s
<
1
2
; and z
l;s
(r

) =
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
+ ": It follows that x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
< z
l;s
(r

);
for every individual.
If, for (l; s) 2

L  S; x
i
0

l;s
  e
i
0
l;s
= z
l;s
(r

) for some i
0
2 I; then z
l;s
(r

)  x
i
0

l;s
<
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
+ ": So r

l;s
>
1
2
; and z
l;s
(r

) =  
P
i2I
e
i
l;s
  ": It follows that x
i
l;s
  e
i
l;s
> z
l;s
(r

);
for every individual.
If, for a 2

A;
b
y
i
0
a
= y
a
(

) for some i
0
2 I; then y
a
(

) >  
b
 since
b
y 2
b
Y: So 

l;s
<
1
2
;
and y
a
(

) =
b
: It follows immediately that
b
y
i
a
< y
a
(

); for every individual.
If, for a 2

A;
b
y
i
0
a
= y
a
(

) for some i
0
2 I; then y
a
(

) <
b
 since
b
y 2
b
Y: So 

l;s
>
1
2
;
and y
a
(

) =  
b
: Again, it follows immediately that
b
y
i
a
> y
a
(

); for every individual.
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Hence, (3) and (4) are satised as well in the denition of an equilibrium.
For the second part of the lemma, one supposes that ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) is an
equilibrium for E : It has been argued in Section 3 that there exists
b
y 2
b
Y such that
((x

;
b
y); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) is an equilibrium for E ; so in particular (x
i
;
b
y
i
) 2 
i
(z

; z

; y

; y

);
i 2 I: The equality of supply and demand in all markets implies (x
i
;
b
y
i
) 2
e

i
(z

; z

; y

; y

);
i 2 I: If there is eective supply rationing in the market for commodity (l; s) 2

LS; then
let r

l;s
be such that z
l;s
(r

) = z

l;s
: If there is eective demand rationing in the market for
commodity (l; s) 2

L  S; then r

l;s
is set so that z
l;s
(r

) = z

l;s
: For all other commodities
(l; s); the ones without eective rationing, r

l;s
= 1=2: If there is eective supply rationing
in the market for asset a 2

A; then 

a
is set so that z
a
(

) = z

a
: If there is eective
demand rationing in the market for asset a 2

A; then 

a
is such that z
a
(

) = z

a
: For all
other assets a; the ones without eective rationing, dene 

a
= 1=2: It follows from the
construction of the functions (z; z; y; y) that (x
i
;
b
y
i
) 2
b

i
(r

; 

); i 2 I; so 0 2
b
(r

; 

):
2
The preparatory work is complete. It remains to show that there exists a zero point of
b
 and thereby, an equilibrium. By Lemma 4.2, this implies the existence of an equilibrium
for E : Moreover, the construction used implies that no equilibrium allocations are lost by
restricting attention to zero points of
b
: Since there is no rationing in the market of the
numeraire asset nor in the market of the numeraire commodities, existence of an equilibrium
is not obvious.
Proposition 4.3 If E satises A1-A4, then an equilibrium for E at prices (p; q) exists.
Proof The correspondence
b
 is non-empty, compact, convex valued and upper hemi-
continuous. It follows that the set
b
(C
LS
 C
A
) is compact.
The set ZY is compact, convex, and it contains
b
(C
LS
 C
A
): The correspondence
 : ZY ! C
LS
 C
A
is dened by
(z; y) = argmaxf
X
(l;s)2

LS
r
l;s
z
l;s
+
X
a2

A

a
y
a
: r 2 C
LS
;  2 C
A
g:
The correspondence ' : ZY  C
LS
 C
A
! ZY  C
LS
 C
A
is dened by
'(z; y; r; ) =
b
(r; ) (z; y):
It is a non-empty, compact, convex valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence dened
on a non-empty, compact, convex set. By Kakutani's xed point theorem, ' has a xed
point, (z

; y

; r

; 

):
If for some a 2

A; y

a
< 0; then by the denition of ; 

a
= 0; so y

a
 0; a contradiction.
If for some a 2

A; y

a
> 0; then by the denition of ; 

a
= 1; so y

a
 0; a contradiction.
Consequently, y

a
= 0; for all a 2

A: Moreover, y

A+1
=  
P
a2

A
q
a
y

a
= 0:
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If for some (l; s) 2

L  S; z

l;s
< 0; then by the denition of ; r

l;s
= 0; so z

l;s
 0; a
contradiction. If for some (l; s) 2

L  S; z

l;s
> 0; then by the denition of ; r

l;s
= 1; so
z

l;s
 0; a contradiction. Consequently, z

l;s
= 0; for all (l; s) 2

L  S: Moreover, for every
s 2 S; z

L+1;s
=  
P
(l;s)2

LS
p
l;s
z

l;s
+R
s
y

= 0:
It follows that 0 2
b
(r

; 

); and, hence, an equilibrium exists. 2
It has been argued before that the conditions under which equilibria exist are very
weak. No restrictions are made on the prices of assets and commodities, apart from the
requirement that the prices of the numeraire assets and the numeraire commodities are 1:
The prices of assets do not have to satisfy the no-arbitrage conditions. Evidently, if the no-
arbitrage condition is violated, one expects that all traders want to operate on the same
side of the asset markets that are needed to construct an arbitrage portfolio. If indeed all
traders are on the same side of an asset market, then no trade is possible in such an assets,
as there are no partners to trade with. Although it is shown in Section 6 that this intuition
is not entirely correct, it still indicates why violation of the no-arbitrage condition is not
inconsistent with existence of equilibrium. Endogenous bounds on trade that arise because
of a lack of trading partners restore the existence of equilibrium.
5 Hart's Counterexample
To gain some additional insight into our equilibrium concept, it is fruitful to analyze the
counterexample to existence of a competitive equilibrium as presented in Hart (1975). We
consider the economy E = ((X
i
; u
i
; e
i
)
i2I
; R(p; q)) with two commodities (L = 1) in each
of the two states (S = 2), two individuals (I = 2) and two assets (A = 1). The utility
functions of the individuals are given by
u
i
(x
i
) = (1=2)u
i
1
(x
i
1
) + (1=2)u
i
2
(x
i
2
);
where
u
1
(x
1
s
) = (3=4) ln(x
1
1;s
) + (1=4) ln(x
1
2;s
)
u
2
(x
2
s
) = (1=4) ln(x
2
1;s
) + (3=4) ln(x
2
2;s
);
and endowments are
e
1
= (e
1
1
; e
1
2
) = ((3=4; 3=4); (1=4; 1=4))
e
2
= (e
2
1
; e
2
2
) = ((1=4; 1=4); (3=4; 3=4)):
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Each of the two future states occurs with probability 1/2, individual 1 spends 75 % of his
total income in each state on commodity 1, and individual 2 spends 75 % of his total income
on commodity 2. Here, income in a state is the income that results after transactions in
the asset markets in the rst period. Household 1 has high endowments in state 1 and will
try to shue income to the other state by appropriate transactions on the asset markets,
whereas the reverse holds for agent 2.
Two assets are traded, the futures for commodities 1 and 2, respectively. The asset
return matrix in nominal terms is given by
R(p; q) =
2
6
6
4
p
1;1
p
2;1
p
1;2
p
2;2
3
7
7
5
:
The economy E has no competitive equilibrium, which follows from the arguments pro-
vided by Hart (1975). If, at competitive equilibrium prices (p

; q

); R(p

; q

) has full rank,
markets are complete; the allocational equivalence with a complete markets equilibrium im-
plies that the equilibrium allocation is given by (x
1
; x
2
) = ((3=4; 1=4; 3=4; 1=4); (1=4; 3=4;
1=4; 3=4)): Optimization within each state implies that p

1;1
= p

2;1
and p

1;2
= p

2;2
: Then the
rank of R(p

; q

) is one, a contradiction to the hypothesis that it has full rank. If R(p

; q

)
has rank one, the no-arbitrage condition on prices of assets implies that it is not possible
to transfer income from one state into the other one by trade in assets. After a certain
state is realized, the economy is like a standard economy with two commodities. It can be
veried that p
1;1
= (5=3)p
2;1
and p
1;2
= (3=5)p
2;2
is the only possibility to clear the spot
markets. But then R(p; q) has full rank, contradicting our supposition.
As before, the price of the second commodity is normalized to 1. If markets were
complete, then the competitive equilibrium price system for commodities would be given
by p = ((1; 1); (1; 1)): The prices of the futures are then determined by a no-arbitrage
condition and equal q = (1; 1): In the economy E this does not constitute a competitive
equilibrium, as markets are not complete if all commodity prices equal one. Endogenous
restrictions on trade emerge at those prices.
The requirement qy
i
= 0 implies y
i
2
=  y
i
1
: The structure of the asset return matrix is
such that no income can be transferred from one state into another, and any y
i
such that
y
i
2
=  y
i
1
leads to the same consumption possibilities for an individual in the second period.
Market clearing implies y
2
=  y
1
: Any feasible allocation of assets ((y
1
1
; y
1
1
); ( y
1
1
; y
1
1
))
can be replaced by the minimal eective allocation of assets ((0; 0); (0; 0)) 2
b
Y : Without
eective rationing, the demand for commodities of individual 1 in state 1 is (9=8; 3=8)
and in state 2 (3=8; 1=8): Without eective rationing, the demand for commodities of
individual 2 is ((1=8; 3=8); (3=8; 9=8)): There is excess demand for commodity 1 in state 1
and excess supply for commodity 1 in state 2, which is also consistent with our observation
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before that a price of 5/3 for commodity 1 in state 1 and a price of 3/5 for commodity 1
in state 2 is needed to clear the markets. The net demand possibilities of individual 1
for commodity 1 in state 1 are determined by the net supply of individual 2 and equal
1/8. Similarly, the net supply possibilities of individual 2 for commodity 1 in state 2 are
determined by the net demand of individual 1 and equal 1/8 as well. An equilibrium for
the economy E at prices p = ((1; 1); (1; 1)) and q = (1; 1) is ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) such
that x
1
= ((7=8; 5=8); (3=8; 1=8)); x
2
= ((1=8; 3=8); (5=8; 7=8)); y
1
= (0; 0); y
2
= (0; 0);
z

1;1
= 1=8; z

1;2
=  1=8; and the other components of z

and z

; as well as y

and y

are
chosen as not to be binding.
Another interesting price system to analyze is the one where period 2 commodity prices
equilibrate the markets, given that no trade takes place in the asset markets in the rst
period. That is, p = ((5=3; 1); (3=5; 1)); so
R =
2
6
6
6
6
6
4
5=3 1
3=5 1
3
7
7
7
7
7
5
:
Again that q = (1; 1): The rst period budget constraint implies y
i
2
=  y
i
1
: If no further
constraints on supply and demand are present, then optimization of individual 1 at prices
p and q leads to a demand x
1
= ((3=5; 1=3); (1; 1=5)) for commodities and y
1
= ( 1; 1) for
assets. The payos of assets enable the rst individual to transfer income to the second
state where he is poor, which is achieved by going short in asset 1 and long in asset 2.
The reverse happens for individual 2, who has a demand x
2
= ((1=5; 1); (1=3; 3=5)) for
commodities and y
2
= (1; 1) for assets if there is no eective rationing.
The asset markets are eectively complete, but the price for commodity 1 in state 1
is higher than the complete markets competitive equilibrium value, whereas the price for
commodity 1 in state 2 is lower. It is not surprising that there is excess supply of com-
modity 1 in state 1 and excess demand for commodity 1 in state 2. Supply of commodity 1
in state 2 by individual 2 falls short of demand by individual 1 by a rather large amount,
which causes individual 1 to be eectively rationed in his demand for that commodity. As
a consequence, individual 1 transfers less income to state 2, and therefore supplies less of
asset 1 in the rst period. It also causes individual 1 to demand more of both commodities
in state 1. Supply of commodity 1 in state 1 by individual 2 will be constrained by the
demand of individual 1, but the constraint will not bite too much as as an unconstrained
individual 2 is not supplying much of that commodity. If individual 2 takes the constraint
on the supply of commodity (1,1) into account, his demand for asset 1 will be somewhat
smaller than 1. Since supply of asset 1 by individual 1 is reduced substantially by the
prospect of demand rationing in state 2, individual 2 becomes eectively rationed in his
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demand for asset 1. At constraints z

1;1
= 0; z

1;2
= 1=3; y

1
= 1=2; the demand of individ-
ual 1 is x
1
= ((3=4; 5=12); (7=12; 1=4)); y
1
= ( 1=2; 1=2); and the demand of individual 2
is x
2
= ((1=4; 7=12); (5=12; 3=4)); y
2
= (1=2; 1=2) : these constraints indeed induce an
equilibrium.
If p = ((5=3; 1); (3=5; 1)); then the price for commodity (1,1) is high and the price for
commodity (1,2) low relative to a complete markets competitive equilibrium. It is not
surprising that in our notion of equilibrium supply rationing arises in the rst market
and demand rationing in the second. At those prices, individuals utilize the assets to
transfer income from one state to another. Even though the prices p = ((1; 1); (1; 1))
are in accordance with a complete markets competitive equilibrium, whereas the prices
p = ((5=3; 1); (3=5; 1)) are not, the spanning opportunities oered by the latter, make
the equilibrium at those prices Pareto dominate the equilibrium at the former. It can be
veried that an increase of the consumption of all commodities in the former equilibrium
by 15 % keeps it inferior to the latter.
6 Arbitrage
An arbitrage portfolio
b
y is such that q
b
y  0; while R
b
y > 0: Prices of assets allow for
arbitrage if an arbitrage portfolio exists. Proposition 4.3 shows that equilibria exist when
prices of assets allow for arbitrage. But the presence of arbitrage opportunities imposes
restrictions on equilibrium rationing schemes.
The utility function of an individual is said to be monotonically increasing in the nu-
meraire commodity in every state of the world if, for all x
i
2 X
i
; for s 2 S; for k  0;
u
i
(x
i
+ k1
(L+1)s
) > u
i
(x
i
):
Proposition 6.1 If E satises A1-A3 and the utility function of every individual is mono-
tonically increasing in the numeraire commodity at every, state of the world, then , if
((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

) is an equilibrium for E and
b
y is an arbitrage portfolio, there exists
for every individual, i; an asset, a 2

A; such that either
b
y
a
< 0 and y
i
a
= y

a
; or
b
y
a
> 0
and y
i
a
= y

a
:
Proof If the statement is false, then there is an individual, i; such that, for every a 2

A;
if
b
y
a
> 0; y
i
a
< y

a
; and if
b
y
a
< 0; then y
i
a
> y

a
: It follows that, for some  > 0;
y

a
 y
i
a
+
b
y
a
 y

a
; for all a 2

A: But then, the pair of a consumption plan and a portfolio
(x
i
; y
i
) dened by y
i
= y
i
+
b
y; x
i
l;s
= x
i
l;s
; for all (l; s) 2

LS; and x
i
L+1;s
= x
i
L+1;s
+R
s
b
y;
for all s 2 S; is an element of the budget set 
i
(z

; z

; y

; y

): Since the utility function is
monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity at every state of the world, u
i
(x
i
) >
u
i
(x
i
); a contradiction. 2
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Proposition 6.1 makes precise what sort of endogenous limitations on trade emerge when
arbitrage possibilities exist. If arbitrage possibilities are present, then each individual will
face constraints on trade in some of the asset markets that are needed to construct an
arbitrage portfolio. These constraints are related to the side of the market on which has to
be to perform the arbitrage. The intuition behind this result is clear. If some individual
faces no constraints, it would add an arbitrage portfolio to its existing portfolio of assets
and thereby increase its utility.
When an arbitrage opportunity is present, all individuals try to prot from it. As a
result, it seems likely that all individuals would be on the same side of all asset markets
that are used in the arbitrage. The endogenous constraints on trade that emerge will then
be such that no trade in these markets is possible.
At an equilibrium, ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)); the market for asset a is closed if y

a
= 0 or
y

a
= 0: If a market is not closed, then it is open. In particular, the market for asset A+1 is
always open. The set of all assets for which markets are open is A

: The associated eective
prices of assets are q

; an eective portfolio is y

; and the matrix of eective payos of
assets is R

: An eective arbitrage portfolio
b
y

is such that q

b
y

 0; while R

b
y

> 0: The
intuition of the previous paragraph suggest that eective arbitrage portfolios do not exist.
Proposition 6.2 If E satises A1-A3, and let the utility function of every individual be
monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity at every state of the world, then,
if ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) is an equilibrium for E at which at most two asset markets are
open, jA

j  2; there is no eective arbitrage portfolio.
Proof If jA

j = 1; the argument is trivial since the only open asset market is the one of
the numeraire asset. The existence of an eective arbitrage portfolio is then contradictory
to the existence of an equilibrium.
If jA

j = 2; then there exists a non-numeraire asset, a 2 A

: If
b
y

is an eective arbitrage
portfolio, then either
b
y

a
= 0 or
b
y

a
6= 0: If
b
y

a
= 0; then q

b
y

 0 and R

b
y

> 0 implies
R
A+1
< 0; so an equilibrium does not exist, a contradiction. If
b
y

a
> 0; then Proposition 6.1
implies that y
i
a
= y

a
; for all i 2 I: Thus, by market clearing, y

a
= 0; and the market for
asset a is not open, a contradiction. If
b
y

a
< 0; it follows by a similar argument that y

a
= 0;
the market for asset a is not open, again leading to a contradiction. 2
Although the result is rather minimal in the sense that it considers only the case with
at most two open asset markets, it conrms standard intuition. The existence of eective
arbitrage portfolios makes all individuals operate on the same side of the markets involved
in the arbitrage, which, as a consequence, close.
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7 An Example Permitting Eective
Arbitrage Portfolios
The result does not extend to equilibria with three or more open asset markets. With three
assets and three individuals, it is even possible that at an equilibrium one individual holds
an arbitrage portfolio that the other two individuals, together, supply. It is surprising that
equilibria with eective arbitrage opportunities may exist.
In the economy E = ((X
i
; u
i
; e
i
)
i2I
; R) there is one commodity (L = 0) at each of the
three states (S = 3), three individuals (I = 3) and three assets (A = 2). The utility
functions are given by
u
i
(x
i
) = a
i
x
i
1
+ b
i
x
i
2
+ c
i
x
i
3
;
where
(a
1
; b
1
; c
1
) = (2; 1; 2);
(a
2
; b
2
; c
2
) = (1; 2; 2);
(a
3
; b
3
; c
3
) = (1; 1; 2);
and endowments are
e
1
= (e
1
1
; e
1
2
; e
1
3
) = (3; 9; 3);
e
2
= (e
2
1
; e
2
2
; e
2
3
) = (9; 3; 3);
e
3
= (e
3
1
; e
3
2
; e
3
3
) = (5; 5; 5):
Prices of commodities and assets are
p = (1; 1; 1);
q = (1; 1; 2):
The matrix of payos of assets is
R =
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
 4 2  2
2  4  2
2 2 6
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
:
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The economy satises Assumptions A1-A3, so Propositions 6.1 and 6.2 apply. At an
equilibrium with one or two open asset markets, an eective arbitrage portfolio does not
exist. Since there are three assets in the economy, Proposition 6.2 does not cover all
possible cases.
An arbitrage portfolio
b
y satises
 4
b
y
1
+ 2
b
y
2
  2
b
y
3
 0;
2
b
y
1
  4
b
y
2
  2
b
y
3
 0;
2
b
y
1
+ 2
b
y
2
+ 6
b
y
3
 0;
with at least one strict inequality, and
b
y
1
+
b
y
2
+ 2
b
y
3
 0:
For  > 0; the portfolio
b
y

= ( ; ; ) is an arbitrage portfolio. It holds that R
b
y

=
(0; 0; 2)
0
> 0; while q
b
y

= 0:
Although the individuals have to choose between 3 assets and 3 commodities, using
the budget constraints, it is easily seen that they actually face a 2-dimensional decision
problem. The budget constraint of individual i holds with equality, and y
i
3
=  (1=2)y
i
1
 
(1=2)y
i
2
: Since
R
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
y
i
1
y
i
2
 
1
2
y
i
1
 
1
2
y
i
2
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
=
0
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@
 3y
i
1
+ 3y
i
2
3y
i
1
  3y
i
2
 y
i
1
  y
i
2
1
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
A
;
an individual with a utility function u
i
(x
i
) = a
i
x
i
1
+ b
i
x
i
2
+ c
i
x
i
3
solves the optimization
problem
max ( 3a
i
+ 3b
i
  c
i
)y
i
1
+ (3a
i
  3b
i
  c
i
)y
i
2
;
s.t. y
i
1
  y
i
2

1
3
e
i
1
;
y
i
2
  y
i
1

1
3
e
i
2
;
y
i
1
+ y
i
2
 e
i
3
;
y
1
 y
i
1
 y
1
;
y
2
 y
i
2
 y
2
:
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If ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)) is an equilibrium for E at prices (p; q); since, for any  > 0;
y

is an arbitrage portfolio, by Proposition 6.1 that all individuals are eectively rationed
in the supply of asset 1 or asset 2. If no individual is eectively rationed in the supply of
asset 2, then every individual is eectively rationed in the supply of asset 1, and market
clearing implies that y

1
= 0: Irrespective of rationing in the demand of asset 2, individual 2
supplies 2 units of asset 2 and individual 3 supply 4/3 units of asset 2, whereas individual
1 demands at most 2 units of this asset, which is a contradiction. Similarly, there is no
equilibrium without eective rationing in the supply of asset market 1. Consequently, in
every equilibrium, there is eective rationing in the supply of both assets. Condition 4 in
the denition of an equilibrium implies that there is no eective rationing in the demand
of any asset. Therefore, the demand for assets 1 and 2, and, hence, for asset 3 as well as
for commodities, is a function of the rationing scheme on the supplies of the assets. The
derivation of the demand functions is facilitated by the graphic illustration of the decision
problem of individual i depicted in Figure 2, where the rationing scheme is taken equal to
y = ( 1; 1):
It is immediately veried that the situation depicted in Figure 2 constitutes an equilib-
rium ((x

; y

); (z

; z

; y

; y

)); with z

and z

not coming into play since there are no non-
numeraire commodities, y

= ( 1; 1)
0
; y

> (2; 2)
0
(the exact choice does not matter).
Then x
1
= (12; 0; 2)
0
; x
2
= (0; 12; 2)
0
; x
3
= (5; 5; 7)
0
; y
1
= ( 1; 2; 1=2)
0
; y
2
= (2; 1;
 1=2)
0
; and y
3
= ( 1; 1; 1)
0
: This describes the unique equilibrium, where equilibria are
equivalent if they dier only with respect to rationing schemes that are not eective.
Indeed, the demands of individuals as functions of the rationing scheme on the supplies
are
x
1
(y) = (12; 0;minf 2y
1
; 6  2y
2
g)
0
;
y
1
(y) = (maxfy
1
; y
2
  3g;maxf3 + y
1
; y
2
g;minf 1
1
2
  y
1
; 1
1
2
  y
2
g)
0
;
x
2
(y) = (0; 12;minf 2y
2
; 6  2y
1
g)
0
;
y
2
(y) = (maxf3 + y
2
; y
1
g;maxfy
2
; y
1
  3g;minf 1
1
2
  y
2
; 1
1
2
  y
1
g)
0
;
x
3
(y) = (5  3y
1
+ 3y
2
; 5 + 3y
1
  3y
2
; 5  y
1
  y
2
)
0
;
y
3
(y) = (y
1
; y
2
; 
1
2
y
1
 
1
2
y
2
)
0
:
The equality of supply and demand for assets 1 and 2, necessary and sucient for equilib-
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Figure 2. Decision problems of the three individuals.
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rium, yields
maxfy
1
; y
2
  3g+maxf3 + y
2
; y
1
g+ y
1
= 0;
maxf3 + y
1
; y
2
g+maxfy
2
; y
1
  3g+ y
2
= 0:
The unique solution is y = ( 1; 1)
0
:
At the equilibrium, individuals 1 and 2, together, supply the arbitrage portfolio that
individual 3 holds.
8 Conclusion
At any prices for commodities and assets, with rationing, an equilibrium allocation of
resources exists under weak assumptions. There is no need to resort to a generic argument,
even when markets are incomplete and assets are real or display an even more complicated
dependence on prices. Neither is there a need to make the usual, but unappealing interiority
assumption on endowments.
The equilibrium concept also provides a solution when the no-arbitrage condition on
prices is not satised. The logical consequence of the existence of arbitrage portfolios is
that all individuals try to exploit these arbitrage opportunities. This limits the possi-
bilities to nd trading partners needed for the arbitrage, which generates endogenously
determined constraints on such trades. Even though markets clear in our concept of equi-
librium, market clearance generally involves endogenously determined amounts of eective
rationing.
Even though arbitrage possibilities are limited by endogenously generated constraints
on trade, it is not necessarily the case that all arbitrage opportunities are eliminated. It
is even possible for an individual to hold an arbitrage portfolio in equilibrium, which is,
because of market clearing, supplied by others. This phenomenon is rather counterintuitive
since the other individuals are not excluded from holding the arbitrage portfolio themselves.
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